GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE BRANCH

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING MESSAGE

MACARTHUR ARCHIVES

PRIORITY ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12 Dec 50

FROM : ALUSNA TAIPEI FORMOSA

TO : CINCFE TOKYO JAPAN, CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR, CSUSAF WASH DC, COMNAVFE TOKYO JAPAN, CNO WASH DC, COM 7TH FLT (TSK), DEPTAR WASH DC, CG FEAF TOKYO JAPAN

NR : 110911 Z

US Military Eyes only.

Naval Liaison sends. Folg is summary of conversations with General Kuochi Chiao Deputy Chief of General Staff and General Hsiao Yi Su Assistant Chief of General Staff upon occasion of farewell talks by Capt Gallaher USN incident detachment.

A. General Kuochi Chiao stated.

a. Positive steps are being taken with the Chinats mil to effect closer coordination between the three services.

b. A Plan for gp of offs from each service to intra-visit service activities and thus become more familiar with each others br and problems will be in full effect by Spring.

c. All LVT will remain assigned to Chinats Marine Corps (Chinats Navy) and will not be split between the Marine Corps and Armored Forces.

d. Steps are being taken to intensify the tng in amphibious warfare and the program will be in full swing in late winter. An order has already been issued for each Chinats Regt on Taiwan to make up a list of outstanding and selected offs to be ordered to amphibious tng in South Taiwan for course in amphibious warfare and thus enlarge greatly the nbr of offs qualified. The list is to be submitted by 1 Jan and the classes to start soon thereafter.

B. General Hsiao stated that.

a. MND was sorry they could not have supplied more positive intelligence on Chicommies in Manchuria when the Chicommie Units crossed the Yalu River but there was a breakdown in the flow from their agents.

(Over)

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~~MNJCS Ltr of 20 Aug 75~~
~~DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF 20 AUG 75~~

[redacted] Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification carried hereon per paragraphs 17a(1)(2) and 41c(2)(3) and g(1), AR 380-5, 15 November 1949.

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DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF 20 AUG. 75

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FROM ADUSNA TAIPEI NR 110911 Z 12 DEC 50 CONFD

General Shu Chih Jou (Chief of Gen Staff) had started to write a personal letter to Gen MacArthur to express his opinion but it was voted down as the letter might have been misconstrued as Nationalist propaganda for their own cause. Additionally Admiral Jarrett and Capt Gallaher were attending the daily Top Secret MND briefings and were transmitting info to Commander 7th Flt and COMNAVFE. (Naval Liaison comment: It appears that MND is very sensitive on this pnt of giving out Chinats propaganda to US Armed Service representatives and have avoided any explanation along this line since 5 Sep when entrance to briefings was given.)

b. Gen Hsiao then expressed several opinions, first Russia is forcing Chicommies to fight in Korea in order that Russia might then more easily atk Japan and take it. Russia wants Mao Tze Tung to control all Asia as a Russian Satellite by having Chicommies take Korea, French Indo China, Burma and Tibet. He believes Chi commies action against Burma shortly. The campaign in Tibet has slowed down momentarily due to cold weather and logistics but is being pressed with same energy as Korea and French Indo China but on a smaller scale. He believes that as soon as Chicommies have secured and consolidated Tibet, Burma and French Indo China that Chicommies will atk India. He believes that Chicommies have no respect for Premier Nehru.

c. He then talked about Chicommie grd force tactics. First that they have been trained one way and that the commander will not deviate from the original tng because lower echelons could not follow through. Second Chicommies prefer to atk moving opponents forces even to the pnt getting them in motion by temporarily falling back. They will not standup for any length of time against strong defenses or defense lines. Third Chicommies troops are not informed as to what damage is being done behind the lines by strategic bombing and thus letting up on strategic bombing and concentrating on tactical bombing of troops, supplies and artillery defenses besides destroying large numbers will also have strong psychological effect.

d. Full cooperation was afforded in all their intelligence to US Service representatives and reqst is made not to hesitate to ask for any intelligence which is not given and they will try to get it.

C. Naval Liaison comment. Was previously stated in dispatches Gen Hsiao very pro American and from observation, very keen and alert officer who uses very methodical steps to reach his opinions.

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FROM : ALUSNA TAIPEI NR : 110911 Z 12 DEC 50 CONT'D

He has actively participated in campaigns in both Manchuria area FIC Border area.

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ACTION : G-2

INFORMATION : COMMANDER IN CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3, JSPOG

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TOO : 110911 Z
MCN : 51153

[redacted] Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification carried hereon per paragraphs 17a(1)(2) and 41c(2)(3) and g(1), AR 380-5, 15 November 1949.

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